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STATEMENT OF THE CASL 
Nature of the Case 
This case raises an apparent issue of first impression in Idaho: Whether a district court 
has the authority to grant the State's motion to reconsider its order \Vithdrawing a defendant's 
guilty plea. Two months after the district court allowed Joshua Riggins to withdraw his guilty 
plea and just three weeks sh011 of trial, it granted the State's motion to reconsider that decision. 
By unilaterally declaring Mr Riggins guilty and taking away his constitutional rights to a jury 
trial, to remain silent, and to confront the witnesses against him. the court exceeded its authority 
and denied Mr. Riggins due process of law. This Court should vacate Mr. Riggins' conviction 
and the order granting the State's motion to reconsider, and remand to the district court for trial. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
During a traffic stop m October 2013, officers allegedly found marijuana and 
paraphernalia in Mr. Riggins' car, and a small amount of methamphetamine in his pocket. 
(PSI, p.3) The State charged Mr. Riggins with felony possession of methamphetamine, 
misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. 
(R., pp.76-77.) Mr. Riggins later pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine, and the State 
dismissed the misdemeanors. (R., pp. 94-105, 107-08; 3/17114 Tr. 1) 
At what \Vas supposed to be the sentencing hearing, Mr. Riggins asked for a continuance 
so that he could move to withdraw his guilty plea. (6/2/14 Tr.) He told the court: ''I was 
supposed to be taking antidepressants at the time ... I wasn't take [sic] my meds at that point." 
1 At the plea hearing, the court told Mr. Riggins that "by entering into this agreement, you waive 
your right to appeal your conviction and the right to appeal your sentence, except to the extent 
that a judge imposes a greater sentence than the State recommended." (3/17/14 Tr., p.4, Ls.19-
23.) Because that plea was later withdrawn and reinstated against Mr. Riggins' will, his appeal 
is properly before this Court. 
(6/2/14 Tr., p.5, Ls.5-8.) Mr. Riggins then filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and to 
substitute private counsel. (R., pp.110-11.) He told the court that he was innocent and believed 
the evidence showed as much. (6/20/14 Tr.. p.6, Ls.3-14.) The State opposed the motion, 
arguing that the plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary: Mr. Riggins' claimed innocence 
was not enough to undo his plea; Mr. Riggins· counsel was effective; and Mr. Riggins already 
looked at his PSI2; and withdrawing the plea ·would prejudice the State because it had dismissed 
the two misdemeanors with prejudice and the delay would adversely impacts its witnesses' 
memories. (R., pp.114-18; 6/20/14 Tr., p.4, Ls.4-14.) The court noted that there was some 
prejudice to the State since it had dismissed the two misdemeanor charges as part of the plea, but 
allowed Mr. Riggins to withdraw his plea. (6/20/14 Tr., p.9, L.19-p.10, L.3.) It explained that 
it was "loathe to force a person to be sentenced when they're maintaining their innocence," and 
that there was some concern about his psychiatric condition when he plcd guilty. (6/20/14 
Tr., p.6, L.16 p.7, L.11; see also R., p.134.) 
Two months later, and a little less than three weeks before trial was set to begin 
(R., p.147), the State filed a motion to reconsider the order granting Mr. Riggins' motion to 
withdraw his plea. (R., pp.153-57). In addition to its original arguments, the State told the court 
that the arresting officer in the case had since taken a job as an undercover agent in Montana and 
therefore was "unable to attend any trial of this matter at all'· because it \vould jeopardize his 
pending investigations. (R., p.154; see also R .. pp.156-58.) 
The court granted the State's motion, explaining that '·there is no meaningful indication 
in the record that Riggins' depression rose to a level that rendered his guilty plea constitutionally 
involuntary," and that the State was prejudiced by Mr. Riggins' withdrawal of his plea because it 
had dismissed two misdemeanor counts as part of the plea and "a necessary State's witness-the 
2 The PSI recommended probation. (PSI, p.18.) 
2 
primary arresting officer-ha[ d] become completely unavailable for trial." (R., pp.163- 64; see 
8/22/14 p.4, L.20 L.19.) 
The court reinstated Mr. Riggins' plea. sentenced Mr. Riggins to three years, with one 
year fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed him on probation. (R., pp.195-97; see also 251-
52.) Mr. Riggins timely appealed. (R., pp.208-09; see also R .. pp.257-58.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err by granting the State's motion for reconsideration because the court did 
not have the authority to reinstate Mr. Riggins' guilty plea? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Did Not Have The Authoritv To Reinstate Mr. Riggins' Guilty Plea. And So 
It Erred By Granting The State's Motion For Reconsideration 
This Court reviews questions of lmv de novo. Pizwto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 795 
(2000). With respect to unobjected-to errors. "'the defendant bears the burden of persuading the 
appellate court that the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists ... ; and (3) was not harmless. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 228 (2010). 
Here. Mr. Riggins objected to the State's motion for reconsideration, but not on the 
grounds that the court lacked the authority to reinstate his guilty plea. The district court's error, 
however, violated Mr. Riggins' umvaived constitutional rights, is clear from the record, and 
cannot be harmless. This Court should therefore vacate Mr. Riggins' judgment of conviction and 
its order granting the State's motion to reconsider the withdrawal of Mr. Riggins' guilty plea, 
and remand to the district court for trial. 
Criminal defendants enjoy the right to a trial by jury, to remain silent. and to confront the 
witnesses against him. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein 
the crime shall have been committed .... "): IDAHO CONST. art. L § 7 ("The right of trial by jury 
shall remain inviolate ... .''). When a defendant pleads guilty, he waives these fundamental 
rights. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992); I.C.R. 11(c)(3). Similarly, when a court 
withdraws that plea, it returns to the defendant to his status quo ante. He regains his right to a 
trial by jury, to remain silent, and to confront the witnesses against him. not to mention his 
innocence. In other words, once the pleas is withdrawn, it is as though the plea never existed in 
the first place. Williams v. State, 762 So. 2d 990, 991 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (explaining that 
"[ w ]hen a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is withdrawn and accepted by the court, it is as if the 
5 
plea had never been entered ab initio," and so the district court could not reconsider its 
decision). Therefore, a district court has no authority to reconsider an order granting the 
defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. Once the plea has been withdrawn. it cannot simply be 
reinstated. 
The logic and policy underpinning this rule is persuasive. Unlike most orders, an order 
withdrawing a defendant's guilty plea necessarily returns to the defendant all of the rights he 
vvaived by pleading guilty. He is once again presumed innocent and had the right to a jury trial, 
to remain silent, and to confront the witnesses against him. Allowing the district court to 
reconsider an order withdrawing a guilty plea in effect allows the district court to unilaterally 
declare the defendant's guilt; take away his rights to a trial by jury, to remain silent, and to 
confront the witnesses against him; and in tum denies the defendant due process of law. 
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (the state cannot deprive a person of "life, liberty, or property, 
without due process oflaw"): IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13 ("No person shall ... be deprived oflife, 
liberty or property without due process oflaw ... ). 
Further, allowing reconsideration of an order withdrawing a guilty plea gives the state the 
unfounded ability to force a defendant to plead guilty if it learns---even months after the 
defendant withdraws his plea-that the case against him has fallen apart. For example, the State 
can ask the court to reinstate that plea by showing that now it is prejudiced because a witness is 
unavailable or the alleged victim has recanted. Such developments have no relation whatsoever 
to a defendant's guilt, do not necessarily relate to any delay caused by a defendant's decision to 
withdraw his plea, and cannot trump a defendant's constitutional right to be presumed innocent 
3 But see People v. Bryant, 860 N.E.2d 511 ( Ill. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the court could 
reconsider and vacate its order granting the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea). 
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unless and until a jury finds him guilty. In short, the State cannot use its inability to win a 
conviction to justify declaring the defendant guilty. 
Yet that is precisely what happened here. Two months passed between when Mr. Riggins 
withdrew his plea and the State moved for reconsideration. During that time, Mr. Riggins was 
presumed innocent. He was preparing for trial. as was his constitutional right Then-less than 
three weeks before trial-the State learned that one of its witnesses was "unavailable." Although 
Mr. Riggins disagrees that the witness was actually unable to testify, that sort of belated 
discovery could not justify forcing Mr. Riggins to plead guilty. Indeed, had Mr. Riggins never 
pled guilty in the first place, the court would not have been able to declare Mr. Riggins guilty 
simply because the State's case against him had fallen apart. But that is just what the district 
court did. It unilaterally declared Mr. Riggins guilty and took avvay his fundamental 
constitutional rights without any due process whatsoever because the State believed it would be 
unable to secure a conviction at trial.4 
When the court granted the State's motion to reconsider, Mr. Riggins was presumed 
innocent and enjoyed all of the rights attendant to that presumption. The district court had no 
authority to declare Mr. Riggins guilty and take away those rights by reconsidering its order 
granting Mr. Riggins' motion to withdraw his plea. In doing so, the court violated Mr. Riggins' 
unwaived fundamental constitutional rights. 5/ee Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. The court's error is 
clear from the record ( 6/20/14 Tr.; 8/22/14 Tr: R., pp.I 34, 160-64 ), and cannot be harmless-
4 Mr. Riggins also contends that the State's motion was untimely and improperly rested on 
factual information not originally considered by the district court, though he acknowledges he 
cannot raise that argument under fundamental error. Because it appears this Court has not 
decided whether consideration new information is proper in a motion to reconsider filed in a 
criminal case, and the usual time limits are inapplicable to the reconsideration of motions to 
withdraw a guilty plea, see First Bank & Trust(?/ Idaho v. Parker Bros., 112 Idaho 30, 32 (1986) 
(holding that "motions for reconsideration presumably must be identified as asserting one of the 
grounds for relief recognized in one of our existing rules, and then must be filed within the time 
provided in that existing rule"), Mr. Riggins asks this Court for its guidance on those issues. 
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absent those violations, Mr. Riggins would have taken his case to a jury. Perry, 150 Idaho 
at 228. This Court should vacate Mr. Riggins· conviction and the order reinstating his guilty 
plea and remand this case to the district court for trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Riggins respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction, 
withdraw his guilty plea, and remand to the district court for trial. 
DATED this 29th day of October, 2015. 
~D~~ 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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